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Financial Distress as a Noncooperative Game: 
A Proposa1 for Overcoming Obstacles to 
Private Workouts 
C laire F inkelstein 
[. I NT RO DUCTI ON 
In the past se veral years, acade mics have increasingly expressed 
di ssatisfac tio n with C hap ter 11. 1 A mong o the r complaints, c ritics po in t out 
that reorgani zations of maj or public companies are ex pens ive and usually take 
a number o f years to comp lete .] In additi on, from the scant empirical 
information available , fa ilure rates appear high. One study shows that 38. 3% 
of reorgani zed co mp anies liquid ate within four years. 3 Accordingly, academic 
writers have cast about for alternatives to court-supervised reorganizations. 
Sugges tions include proposals for an all-equity capital structure,4 market-based 
solutions like mand atory auctions ,5 and measures designed to e ncourage 
private workout agreements which avo id the need for judicial supervi sion 
a I together. 6 
I. I I U.S.C. ~~ 1101- 1174 (1 988). Sl'c. e.g .. Barry E. Adler, Bankm ptcy and R isk Allocation, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 439 ( 1992): Douglas G. Baird, Th e Un easy Case fo r Corpora te Reorganizm ions. 15 J. 
LEGAL STU D. 127 ( 1986); Mi chael Bradley & Mic hael Rosenzweig, Th e Untenab le Case fo r Chapter II , 
10 1 YA LE L.J . 1043 ( 1992) . 
2. There is disagreement about the average length of reorgan izat ions for large, publi c compani es. On e 
study shows they rake lV2 years on ave rage to complete . Ly nn M. Lopucki & William C. Whit fo rd, Venue 
Choice and Fo rum Shopping in rhe Bankmprcy Reorganizarion of Large, Publicly Held Compan ies, I 99 1 
Wts . L. REV. 1 I, 3 1-32 n.68 (ca lcula ted from information prov ided). Another indicates an average of 
almos t four years. Jul ian R. Fran ks & Walte r N. Torous, rln Empiricul ln vesrigarion of U. S. Firms in 
Reorgani::.arion , 44 J. Fl;o.;. 747, 748 ( 1989) . 
3. See Bradley & Rose nzwei g. supm note I, at 1075 (Table I I) (showing 61.7 % of firms sti ll in 
operati on after four years). 
4. See Barry E. Ad ler, rl Political Theory of Ame rican Corporate Bankruptcy, TEX. L. REV. 
(fo rthcom ing 1993) (manuscri pt at 18, on fil e with author) (proposing a fi rm structured ent irely through 
issuance of a fo rm ol· prefe rred stock ca lled "chameleon equity"): Brad ley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, 
at I 053 -54 (proposing an equ ity-based "perfec t markets solut ion"). 
5. See Douglas G. Baird , Revi sit ing Auctions in Chapte r I I (Chicago Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 7 (2nd Series), 1992); Bruce A. Markell , Own ers, Auctions, and Absolwe Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reo rganiza tions, 44 STAN . L. REV . 69 ( 199 1). 
6. Howard J. Kashner. Majoritv Clauses and Non-Bankruplcy Corporate Reorganizarions-Con trac tual 
and Starwory Ailem ari,•es, 44 Bus . LAW 123 ( 1988) (proposi ng modification of Trust Indenture Act to 
permit majority rule clauses in debt cont racts) ; Mark J. Roe, The Voring Prohibition in Bond Workows, 97 
YALE L.J . 232 ( 1987) (same): Alan Schwartz, Bankmprcy Workou ts and Debt Contracts, J.L. & ECON. 
(forthcomi ng 1993) (arg uing that li ft ing ban on waiver of bankruptcy wou ld facilitate pri va te workouts). 
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From a theoretical perspecti ve, private solutions are preferabl e to public 
o nes . F irst, beca use of the great ex pense of fo rmal judicial proceedings, pri vate 
negoti ati o ns shoul d produce substanti al sav ings over li tiga tion .7 Second, 
co nsen sual reso lution of disputes is more like ly to maximi ze prefe rences than 
a so lutio n forced on parties in the co urse of litiga tion-' Third, public 
procedures, such as liti gat ion and aucti ons, explo it publi c funds fo r the sake 
o f pri va te dispute resolution. Any benefits to the ge nera l publi c from these 
expe nditures would be indirec t, and presumabl y d irect and more substantia l 
be nefits would result from alternati ve expenditures . For these reasons, scholars 
sho ul d to look for ways of removing the obstac les to p rivate settleme nts before 
searchin g for alte rnati ve public procedures . 
Thi s Note presents a contrac tual sc heme to increase the li kelihood of 
settlin g co nfli cts inc ident to fin anc ial d istress ou t of court: the incorporati on 
into debt contracts of a clause suspend ing c reditors ' state- law collect io n ri ghts 
fo r a fi xed period of time. Part II diag noses the imped iments to pri vate 
workout agreements under current contrac tual prov is ions. It argues tha t the low 
settl eme nt rate is caused by a collecti ve acti on problem whi ch prohibi ts 
negotiation in a multi-creditor situatio n. It th en considers the effect of 
uncerta inty on the above anal ys is. In particular, this Part rebuts the possible 
obj ecti on that the uncertainty of Chapter ll li tigation provides a better 
ex planation for the low settlement rates. Part III sho ws why the parties must 
imple me nt an y consensual solution to the coll ecti ve ac tion proble m in the 
origin a l debt contracts. In theory, a direc t, intercreditor contract drafted ex 
a nte-prior to the onset of fin anc ial distress-could avo id collec ti ve ac tion 
problems . Part III, however, ex plains why transac tion cos ts bar such an 
agreeme nt, and thus wh y creditors must make use of the ir commo n relation 
w ith the debtor to control the behav ior of o ther c red itors. Part IV presents the 
proposed suspension clause solution. It considers , among other things, the 
problem of preferential treatment of certain creditors prior to the pub lic 
declaratio n of fin ancial distress . This Note argues that appendin g a unanimous 
co nsent condition to the suspension clause woul d effectively solve the 
prefere nce problem. Part V explains that the inclus ion of unanimous consent 
c lauses in debt contrac ts would eliminate anothe r potential impediment to 
private workou ts, the "holdout" problem.9 It al so argues that scholars often 
7. Bankruptcy proceedings are expensi ve and auctions may be as well. There is evidence sugges ting 
not on ly that aucti ons arc more expensive than pr·ivate workouts . but that they are even more e xpensive 
than reorgan izations. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corpora1e Bankrrtprcr Efficient '· 27 J. FIN. ECON. 4 11, 
4 15 ( 1990); see also Ad ler, supra note I , at 469-7 1. 
8. Thi s conclusion assumes that bargaining is fai r, in other words , that there is no ove rreaching or 
coerc ion. See Alan Schwartz, A Th eory of Loan Priorities , 18 .1. LEGAL STUD . 209, 210- 11 ( 1989) (argu ing 
for repeal of legal constraints on con tracting to es tabli sh alte rnate priori ty schemes based on commi tment 
to pe rmit contractin g part ies to maxi mize preferences). 
9. Str ic tl y speak ing the holdout problem is another species of co llective ac tion problem. It is referred 
to here as the holdout prob lem in order to di stingui sh it fro m the co llecti ve acti on problem co nsi de red in 
Part IL 
r 
\ 
[ 
I .. 
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exaggerate the importance of the holdout problem as an adequate explanation 
for the low success rates of pri vate workouts. This emphasis on holdouts leads 
them to overl ook the correct ex planation, the collec ti ve ac ti on problem. 
II. THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM 
Until relatively recently, the prevailing academic wisdom on corporate 
reorgani zation justified Chapter 11 on efficiency grounds: Chapter 11 prevents 
the di smantling under state coll ection laws of fir ms whose going-co ncern value 
exceeds their liquidation value. 10 Without Chapter 11, creditors would pursue 
immed iate sati sfaction of their claims against a fmancially distressed debtor. 
This would forfe it the excess of the going-concern value over the liquidation 
value, and the creditors as a group would rece ive less than they would were 
they willing to wait. 11 Federal intervention is justified, the argument run s, 
because it so lves a co llec ti ve ac tion problem. 12 
T homas Jackson and Douglas Baird , the o rigin al proponents o f thi s view 
of federal reorganization, present what they call the "c red itors' bargain model" 
of federal bankruptcy law. 13 Chapter 11 , they claim, implements the 
agreement the creditors of a common debtor would reac h if collec tive action 
problems did not preclude negotiations. J\!Jwu/{l[ing collect ive proceedings, 
Jackson and Baird argue, thus helps to maximize the preferences of creditors, 
since the payoff structure otherwise precludes creditors from realizing the 
outcome they would regard as most advantageous. 
The scant available empirical evidence supports Jackson and Baird 's 
diagnosis o f the problem. Settlement rates in bankruptcy are disproportio nately 
I 0. T HOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LiMITS OF B,\NKRUPTCY LAW 17 ( 1986). For an 
examp le of a recent , opposing view, see Elizabeth Warren, Bankrup!cy Po/icv, 54 U. CH I. L. REV . 775 
( 1987) . See also Theodore Eisenberg, Commenta ry on "On the N(l{ure of Bankmptcy": Bankruptcy and 
Bargaining. 75 VA. L. REV. 205 ( 1989). 
II . "Common pool problems," as this type of collec ti ve ac ti on problem is ca lled, can arise in any 
si tuation in wh ich multip le claims are asserted against an undivided pool of asse ts. Extens ive discussions 
on the su bj ec t appear in the literalu rc on natural resou rces such as natural gas, oil , minerals , and ocean 
resources. See. e.g .. A lan E. Friedman, Th e Economics of !he Common Pool: Property Rigllls in Exha11slible 
Reso11rces, 18 UCLA L. REV . 855 ( 1971 ); Gary D. L ibecap & Steven N. Wi gg ins, Comrau ual Responses 
/o !he Common Pool: Proraling of Cmde Oil ProduCiion , 74 A:VI. ECON. REV. 87 ( 1984); Richard J. 
Sweeney et al., lvfarkel Failure, The Common-Pool Problem. Oil(/ Ocean l?esource Exploiu11ion , 17 J. L AW 
& ECON. 179 (1974). 
12. JACKSON, supra note I 0, at I 0. 
13. Se e, e.g ., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOM AS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON 
B AN KRUPTCY (2d ed. 1990): JACKSON, supra note I 0; Baird, supra note I , at 127-28; Douglas G. Baird 
& Th omas Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and !he Trea /menc of Diverse Ownership Imerests: A 
Comment on Adeqtwle Protecuon of Secu red Creditors in Bankrup!cy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 ( 1984); 
Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Cotporate 
Reorganizcllions, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 ( 199 1 ): Thomas H. Jackson , Bankruptcy, Non-Bankrup1cy 
Entitlenzenls, and 1he Creditors' Barga in, 91 YALE L.J. 857 ( 1982) [hereinafter Jackson, Creditors· 
Bargain]; Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On 1he Nmure of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy 
Sharing and 1he Credi10rs' Bargain. 75 VA. L. REv. !55 (1989). 
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low as compared with other areas of the law. 14 Studies indicate that workout 
offers from insolvent firms succeed in fewer than half the cases , 15 whereas 
settlement rates in other kinds of private suits exceed 90%.16 Private suits in 
other domains , however, do not appear to diffe r in re levant ways from 
litigation in Chapter 11. Reorganizations of large, public companies may be 
exceedingly complex, but settlement rates in contexts other than financial 
distress are high even for complex disputes involving major corporate 
players. 17 Moreover, once the relevant parties actually ente r negotiations, the 
prospects of reaching agreement are high. Bankruptcy litigation under Chapter 
11 almost always res ults in the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 18 In 
addition, the vast bu lk of successful reorganizations occurs consensually. 
"Cramdowns" 19 are quite rare 20 
Taken in combination, the above data suggest that there are no significant 
impediments to agreement. Therefore , settlement rates in the financial distress 
14. This Note defi nes a "settlement'' as any case whose final reso lution took place out of court. This 
would include cases in which the parti es entered liti gati on initi all y but were able to reach agreement 
privately at a later stage. 
15. See Robert Gertner & David Sharfstein , A Th eory of Workouts and the Effec ts of Reorganization 
La w, 46 J. FI N. 11 89, 1191 (1 991 ) (showin g ini tial settlement rates of 73 out of 156 fo r junk bond issues 
between 1977 and 1990); Stuart C. Gi ]son, Bankmptcv, Boards. Banks and Blockh olders: Evidence an 
Ch anges in Carporute Ownership and Control \Vhen Firms Dejalllt , 27 j. Fi N. ECON . 355, 356 (1990) 
(showing private debt restructuring of 50 out of Ill publicly traded companies that experienced fin ancial 
di stress between 1979 and 1985); Stuart C. Gilson et al. , Troubled Debt Restrucwrings: An Empirical Study 
of Pri vate Reorganizmion of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 326 ( 1990) (showin g private 
restructurings for 80 public companies out of s~mple of 169 that experienced financial distress between 
1978 and 1987). 
16. Mi chael D. Green, Sy mposium . The lnabiliry af Offensive Colla te ral Es toppel to Ful fi ll i1s 
Promise: An Examination of Es iOppel in Asbes tos Litigation , 70 IOWA L. REV. 14 1, 180 ( 1984); see 
ANNUA L REPORT OF THE DI RECTOR. AD,vJINI STR ATIV E OFFICE OF TH E U:'o! ITED STATES COURTS, 1989 
REPORT OF THE PR OCEEDI NGS OF TH E JUDI CIAl . CONFERENC E OF TH E UNITED STATES 21 (over a twel ve-
month period in 1988-89 , onl y 5% of civil cases in federal court went to trial ). But see Janet C. Alexander, 
Do the M erits Matter ? A S1udy of Settlements in Securi ties Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV . 497, 525 
( 1991 ) (es timating the rate of civil suit se ttlemen t as between 60% and 70%). 
17. See Alexander, supra note 16, at 525 (se ttlement rates for securities class actions higher than for 
civil litigation generally, roughly 95%): Green, supra note 16, at ISO (settleme nt 1·ate of approximatel y 95% 
for major asbes tos cases); Richard L. Schmal bec k & Gary Mye rs, A Policy Analysis of Fee-Shifting Rules 
Under the In te rna l Revenue Code. I 986 DUKE L.J. 970, 979 (set tl ement rates in appellate level tax di sputes 
sarne for large cases as for small ). Even the massive legal di spute between Texaco and Penn zoil over the 
acquisiti on of Getty Oil ended in se ttlement (albeit after ex tensive lit igation in a number of different 
courts) . See Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wil son, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: 
Underswnding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 V A. L. REV. 295. 296 ( 1989) . 
18. See Lopucki & Whitford , Sitpra note 2, 18, at 41 n. l 05 (fi nding confirmation rates of 89% to 96% 
for largest Chapter II 's fil ed betwee n 1979 and 1988); see also Gilson et al., supra note 15, at 31 6, 32 1 
(showing a conversion rate from Chapter I I to Chapter 7 of 5% for sample of publicl y traded companies 
that filed for bankruptcy between 1978 ::mel 1987 ). 
19. The debtor's power, under II U.S. C. § 1129( b) ( 1988), to im pose a plan over the objection of 
creditors if he can show the pl an co nfo rm s to the absolute priority rule is known as the "cramclown" power. 
20. See Gilson et al., supra note 15, at 31 8; Lynn M. Lopucki & William C. Whitford, Preemplive 
Cram Do wn , 65 AM. BAN KR. L.J . 625, 627,629 (1 99 1) (study of reorganization s of 43 large, publicly he ld 
compani es showed plan proponents sought cramdow n in only three cases). As we shall see, however, the 
holdout problem may impair the prospects fo r reachin g agreement even when the re levant parties are able 
to negoti ate in the private context. Because Chapter II gives debtor and majority creditors the power to 
bind dissenters, the holdout problem does nor stand in the way of agreement in Chapter II in the same way 
that it does outside it. 
T 
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context could equal those in other types of di sputes. A plausible explanation 
for the low se ttlement rates is that a collective action proble m impedes 
otherwise feasible agreements. Proponents of the creditors' bargain model thus 
correctly assert that Chapter 11 allows the parties to achieve a solution 
comparable to one they would reach through negotiations were it possible to 
eliminate collective action problems. 
The collective action problem is a species of n-person prisoner's dilemma 
("P-D"). The problem is that each creditor' s pursuit of a rational strategy 
maximizing her welfare in the short run produces an outcome which is 
suboptimal for all. Another possible outcome, the cooperative solution, 
improves the collective welfare, even from an individual max imizing 
perspective. By following individual maximizing strategies, however, the 
parties foreclose this solution. 
To take a simple, two-party example, suppose a debtor has only two 
creditors, both unsecured. Each creditor has a claim against the debtor for 
$ 100. Suppose al so that the debtor has only one asset, a machine worth exactly 
$100 if sold. The liquidation value of the debtor 's business is thus $100. But 
adding the debtor's expertise makes the business worth $!50 as a going 
concern. Each creditor faces a choice: either seek immediate satisfaction of her 
claim, or wait and hope to capture the going-concern value. Suppose Creditor, 
decides to demand immediate repayment. If Creditor2 decides to wait, Creditor, 
will recover her claim in full. But Creditor2 may also decide to seek immediate 
recovery. Since, ex ante, each creditor has a 50% chance of getting to the 
debtor first, the value of the claim diminishes in accordance with the 
probability of its satisfaction in full. The claims ex ante are thus worth $50 to 
each creditor if both pursue collection immediately.21 Alternatively, Creditor , 
could decide to wait. If, however, Creditor2 decides to seek payment, Creditor, 
will lose completely. If both decide to wait, each will eventually recover 
$75. 22 Each party's dominant strategy is to seek payment, but exercising these 
strategies simultaneously is inefficient. Unfortunately, however, only this 
solution is a Nash23 equilibrium. 
2 1. Ex post, of course. thi s is no longer the case. Either Creditor, or Creditor2 will get to the debtor 
tirst, and one will receive $ 100 while the other receives nothing. But from the ex ante perspect ive, the 
claim can be thought of as worth $50 in the case in which both pursue simultaneously. 
22. The chart below indicates the payoffs. (The left-hand nu mber is Cred itor, 's payoff. the right-hand 
Cred itor2 's.) 
CREDITOR, -
Seek Payment Wait 
Seek Payment $50, $50 $100, $0 
CREDITOR, 
Wait $0, $ 100 $75, $75 
23. Nash equilibrium is a game theoretic concept used to describe a strategy combination in which no 
player has incentive to deviate from hi s strategy given tha t the other players do not dev iate . See ERIC 
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This case, however, di ffers from the usual P-D situation in one important 
respec t. In the usual P-D, the parties cannot make binding agreements. 
T herefore , even if they agree in advance to cooperate, they cannot trust one 
another not to defect. In th e present situation , the problem is not that an 
agreement would not be binding . On the contrary, an intercreditor agreement 
would be enforceable as is any other legally bi nding contract. "~ The problem 
li es instead in the fact that th e parties cannot negotiate with o ne another at any 
point before or durin g the game. 
The impositio n o f the automatic stay25 in reorgani zatio n proceedings 
facilitates cooperation by e liminating the payoffs from noncooperati ve 
behavior. Proponents of the creditors ' bargain model are right thus far. But thi s 
resu lt does not constitute an adequate justification for Chapter 11. ~ 6 For the 
fo llowing reasons, Chapter 11 is a suboptimal solution to the collec ti ve action 
problem. First , the return to the parti es if they liti gate is lower than it wo ul d 
be if they cou ld cooperate without court supervis ion. Private settlement creates 
a cos t savings which the parties cou ld divide pro rata. Second , to the ex tent 
that Chapter 11 is the only way to prevent a run on assets , debtors are fo rced 
to take refuge in Chapter II even when they have no other reaso n fo r us ing 
a court- superv ised procedure . The collective action problem and the lack of 
available alternatives to a Chapter 11 fi ling thus encourage use of federal 
bankruptcy law that would otherwise be unnecessary. A solution to the 
collec ti ve ac tion problem that severed collecti ve ac tion from di stributi onal 
questions woul d enable debtors to choose to enter C hapter 11 only when they 
required the full range of court powers to facilitate acceptance o f a plan. 
RASMUSEN, GAMES .'< ND INFORMATION : AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME TH EORY J J ( 1989) . 
24. The fi nancia l di stress game may occupy an intermediate status be tween fu ll y cooperative and fully 
noncooperative games. See JOHN C. Hi\RSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAV IOR AND BARGAINING EQUII.IBRIUM IN 
GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIOi\S 110- 11 ( 1977) (discussing one such interm ediate catcgo1·y called the 
almosr-noncooperative game). 
25 . II U.S.C. ~ 362 ( 1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
26. A nalogous argu ments fo r mandatory schemes have greater force in an extralegal context. Some 
commentato 1·s, fo r example, interpret Hobbes ' justification for the existence of govemment as a solution 
to a P-0 problem. See JEAN HAMPTON, HOB BES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TR ADITI ON ( 1986). She 
argues that the inhabitants of the state of natme-descrihcd by Hobbes as a state of " Warrc . where every 
man is Enemy to every man." and in which " men l i ve wi thout other security, than what their own strength , 
and their own inventi on shall fu rn ish them w ithall ." T IIOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATIIAN 186 (C.B. Macpherson 
ed., 1968) ( 165 1 )-arc in a noncooperative game that has the structure of a P-D. A lthough all would bene lit 
from cooperati on, they cannot cooperate because no agreement can be bindin g. As Hobbes says . "'the 
question is not of promi ses mu tual I, where there is no securi ty of performance on either side: as w hen there 
is no Civi ll Power erected ove r the parties promising;Jor such promises are no Covenants . .. . ··/d. at 204 
(emphasis added). The coerci ve power of a strong, central authority is justi!l ed as the onl y way to ex it from 
the P-D. 
Thi s game theoretic j ustifi cati on fo r ci vil government depends on the assumption that the parti es 
cannot make binding agreements. In the bankruptcy contex t, by contras t, because there is a legal system 
in effect , the parties could make binding contracts if only they cou ld negotiate. See supra text 
accompanying note 24. If the creditors are in a sem icooperati ve game, the justifi ca tion for mandatory 
soluti ons may not appl y. 
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Another possible explanation for the low settlement rates , however, might 
be advanced. Parties vvill go to court only if the outcome of litigation is 
uncertain: it must either be the case that the ir expectations about the resu lts of 
trial conflict, or that one or both parties lack clear expectations about the 
result. 27 One mi ght. then, explain the low settlement rates by saying that 
Chapter l J litigation is substantially more uncertain than other types of 
liti gati on. Higher leve ls of certainty in other areas of the law produce higher 
settlement rates . Se ttl e me nt rates in the financial distress context may be low 
simply because the parties bargain in the shadow of bankruptcy law. Without 
firm expectations abou t their bankruptcy shares, the parties have may have 
insuffic ie nt informatio n to negot iate. 
A deta iled considerat ion of the effects of uncertainty is beyond the scope 
of this Note. It will suffice to show that the above argume nt suffers from two 
flaws. First, it is not clear that the outco me of Chapter II litigation is more 
uncertain than outcomes in other types of litigation . Indeed , creditors may have 
greater certainty about the outcome of litigation in bankruptcy than liti gants do 
in o ther contexts , s ince the parti es know that the court will apply the absolute 
priority rule in bankruptcy. and will require the debtor to disclose all rele vant 
financial information. A rebuttal would point out that reorgani zation plans 
systematically vio late absolute priority. Equity regularly receives on the orde r 
of 5 %2~ in C hapter ll. But because the return to equity is reliable and 
systematic, v iolations of absolute priority may not , in the long run , increase the 
parties' level of uncertainty. 
Second , while it is true that certainty leads to se ttlement, the converse does 
not follow. Uncertainty may or may not lead to litigatio n. Even under 
uncertainty, the parties may prefer to settle in order to capture the savings from 
the avoided litigation costs. This is especially so if the parties' expectations , 
although uncertain, happe n to coincide. Some authors have indeed argued that 
uncertainty fuels settl ement. 2~ Although the e ffects of uncertainty on 
settlement rates remains an open question, uncertainty appears to be a 
necessary but not a suffi c ient condition for liti gati on. 
27. Sa. e.g., George L. Priest & Benjam in Klei n, Th e Selecrion of Displllesfor Litigarion , 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 17 ( 1984) (" In liti gati on . as in gambling, agreement ove r the outcome leads parties to drop out. '") ; 
Steve n Shavell, Suit, Se11/ement. and Trial: A Theorerica/ Analysis Under Altemative ivfethods for the 
Allocation of Legal Costs, I I 1. U·:GAL STUD . 55, 63 ( 1982) ("[T]he onl y factor that cou ld lead to a tri al 
is that the plaintiff's expectations as to the likelihood of success or the judgment that could be obtained 
are more optimistic than the defendant's" ). 
28. Studies show that reo rgan ization plans routinely vi ol ate abso lute pt·iority. See Lynn M. Lopucki 
& William C. Whitford. Bargaining Over Equity~· Share in the Bankruptcv Reorganization of Lw:~e. 
Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 142 ( 1990) (Table IIJ ); see also Schwartz, supra note 
6, at 10- 11. This can probab ly be explained by the fact that it is difficult for manage ment to remai n in 
possession without the acq uiescence of the shareholders. 
29. See Peter H. Sc huck, Th e Role ofl11dges in Sellling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 
53 U. CHI. L. RE V. 337. 346 n.JO (noting '"a strong positi ve relationship between uncertainty of outcome 
and settl ement") ; see u/so Eisenberg , supra note I 0, ;.t t 210. 
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Finally, while uncertainty impairs the parties' ability to reach agreement, 
it need not have this same effect on the ir ability to negotiate. If uncerta inty 
caused low settlement rates, one wou ld ex pect to see many private workouts 
attempted and high rates of failed negotiation s. The limited evidence there is, 
however, indicates the contrary. Corporations in serious distress te nd to ente r 
Chapter 11 immediately upon reaching the cri tical level of insolvency. In most 
cases. th ey do not even attempt a private workout before they resort to 
liti gati on30 Tf uncertainty affects the prospec ts of settlemen t, it is more likely 
w hen the parties can negoti ate and yet cannot agree. Although there is virtually 
no empiri cal evidence on the question, such cases probably compri se only a 
small frac tion of those that end up in Chapter 11.31 
Before turning to the proposed suspension clause so lution, this Note w ill 
consider whether the debtor's assets cou ld be distributed prior to the o nset of 
financial distress by a direct, intercreditor ag reement. 
III. EX ANTE l NTERCREDITOR AGREEMENTS 
The parties could cooperate if they could agree in advance to play the ir 
no ndominant strategies . Part II argued th at a coll ec ti ve action problem 
precludes the creditors from committing themse lves to this result consensually, 
because it impedes the parties from negotiating with one another. This 
impediment to negotiation , however, emerges only after the onset of financial 
distres s. If creditors could sit down at the bargaining table before they learned 
of their common debtor' s financial distress-in o ther words, before they k new 
their relative priorities-they could pres umably settle on a course of action fo r 
resolving common financial problems.32 Because an ex ante agree ment of thi s 
sort would result from bargaining behind a "ve il of ignorance," 33 the creditors 
30. See Lynn M. Lopucki, The Debtor in Full Cmllrol: Systems Failure Under Chapter J I of the 
Bankmptcv Code.?, 57 AM BAN KR. L.J. 99, 116 (1983) (characte rizing as exaggerated view that 
negot iati ons are commonly attempted and presenting study of 48 ban krupt compan ies showi ng that none 
had attempted workout s) . See also J. Bradley John ston, The !Junkruptcy !Jargain: National Confe rence of 
!Jankruptcy Judges, 65 AM . BANKR. L.J . 2 13, 232 n.97 ( 1991) (Pointing out that workouts arc generally 
not attempted by firm s that later file fo r bankruptcy, despite co mmonly held view that workouts are 
common ). 
3 i. The Lopuck i study appears to be the onl y ev idence thJt bears on the question , see supra note 30, 
at 116, and the sample of fi rm s examined in that study is not suffic ientl y !Jrge to allow reliabl e inferences 
about the overall nu mber of attempted workouts to be clrJwn. The hypothesis that fe w firm s that enter 
Chapter II have actuall y attempted workouts is not, however. an unreasonable working hypothesi s. 
32. Thomas Jackson and Robert Scott present a justifi ca ti on of bankruptcy along these lines. They 
modify the ori ginal creditors' bargain model by argui ng that Jn ex <:nte bargain among creditors would be 
motivated by a desi re to provide fo r risk-sharing in the event of a com mon disaster. Jackson & Scott, supra 
note 13; but see Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "On the Na ture of Bankruptcy": !Jankmptcy, Priorirv, and 
Economics, 75 VA . L. REV . 2 19, 221 ( 1989) (argui ng that creditors may not want to share ri sks e~ ante 
because "the costs of ascertai ning the full ran ge and probability of potenti al ou tcomes is too hi gh. ") 
33 . JOH N RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE ( 1971 ). For an attempt to appl y Rawlsian analys is to the 
bankruptcy situati on, see Donal d R. Korobkin, Con/rae/arianism and the Nonnative Fottndations of 
Bcmkruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541 ( 1993). 
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would not know enough about the ir respecti ve pos itio ns relati ve to the debtor 
to adopt indi vidual maximizing strategies. Collective act ion problems would 
not arise. Moreover, if the parties are generall y risk-averse, the ir rational 
strategy would be to maximize the common welfare. They would agree to 
share losses fairly-equally if they have no information about the ir future 
re lations to the debtor, or pro rata if they have some knovvledge about the size 
of the ir respective loans and anticipated priorities.-'4 
All potential creditors would have to contract to cover all contingenc ies 
created by their varying interests if ri sks are to be di stributed in advance 
through an ex ante agreement. At this stage, however, it is imposs ible to know 
wh ich individuals must be party to such an agreemen t. In Arms of any 
substantial s ize , the identity of creditors and the amount of debt is li ke ly to 
fluctu ate constantly, and, es pecially where trade cred it is concerned , the 
identity of creditors may not always be known. Debt contracts may be oral, 
and the debtor may not have a precise record of the status of its debt at any 
given moment in time. Thus, neither the identity of the creditors, nor the 
amount of insolvency, can be determined prior to the onset of financial 
di stress . 
\Vhile a co ll ect ive act ion problem bars agreement ex post, transaction costs 
of a certain kind bar agreements ex ante. 35 Not surprisingl y, proponents of the 
cred itors' bargain model use the existence of transaction costs, along with the 
co ll ect ive action problem, to justify Chapter 11 . They argue that court-
supervised reorganizati on implements the agreement the parti es to a C hapter 
11 proceed ing would have reac hed if transaction costs did not preclude private 
agreement. 36 
34. See Alan Schwartz, ContraCiingfor Priority Positions (u npublished manusuipt, at 4) (on t1 1e with 
author) (a rgui ng that borrowers can expect to cont ract fo r at leas t two classes of debt) At the early ex an te 
stage under co nsideration , however, creditors will not necessarily know to wh ich class they will be long, 
even if they can antici pate that there will be more than one class of debt. The ide ntity of the lende r will 
nevertheless provide an indi cati on. 
35. It may see m mi sleading to sugges t that the task of identifying the re levan t p:mics ex ante is 
prohi bited merely by the expense of searching fo r them. The concept of transaction costs, however, is 
sometimes given a broad interpretation; it applies to virtually any feature of a situation that makes it more 
difficu lt to conduct consensual transactions. See Guido Calabres i & Dou glas Mel:!med, Propern· Rules, 
Liabilit\' Rules. and fn alienabiliry: One View of the Cathedral, 85 H ARV. L. REV. I 089 . I 094-95 ( 1972) . 
36. Thomas Jackson appears to be concerned with transact ion costs, a lthough he does not usc the term 
explicitl y: 
Although we would expect to see a mandatory collec tive proceeding as a standard feat ure of 
the creditors' bargain, no ex an te meeting of the credito rs wil l, rea li st ical ly, take place. A 
debtor's pool of credito rs changes over time and even the debtor is un li kely to know who the 
creditors of the business will be at any point in the future. As a resu lt , the cred itors themse lves 
cannot be expected to negoti ate this agreement, even though it would be in the ir joint interest 
to do so. A federal bankru ptcy rule solves thi s problem by making availab le a mandatory 
collective sy stem after insolvency has occu rred . 
Jackson. Creditors' Bargain, S11pra note I 3, at 866-67 (c itati ons omitted). Jackson concl udes that because 
credi to rs cannot con tract ex ante on their own, a mandatory sharing ru le, such as that provided by Chapter 
I I, is justified, since it effec tuates the solution the parties would have reached had agreement been possible. 
As discussed above, however, the ineffi cacy of consensua l solut ions can not provide a justification fo r a 
mand atory scheme unless it can be show n that no alternati ve means of overcoming the impedi ments to 
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An analogous argument justifies protecting interests in person and property 
with a liability rule in the context of automobile accidents. 37 A liability rul e 
permits individuals to impose risks as long as they "buy" the privilege ex post. 
The argument holds thi s is desi rable, because parties to an accident are barred 
by high transacti on costs from distributing the losses from an accident by 
contract in advance. 33 No wealth has been transferred before the accident. Ex 
ante, the potential victim still has something to "sell" to the potential injurer, 
namely his willingness to be exposed to danger at some time in the future. 
Thus the pa11ies can bargain ex ante. Ex post, however, no bargain can take 
place, since the loss has fallen entire ly on the victim, and the injurer has no 
incenti ve to agree to share that loss . Thus, bargaining must take place ex ante, 
but because transaction costs prohibit ex ante bargaining , a mandatory 
distributional rule is indi spensab le. 
Although in the accident case transaction costs preclude negotiation at the 
only conce ivable bargaining point, namely ex ante, financial distress is 
different. The debtor 's declaration of financial distress identifies the relevant 
parties . Unlike in the accident s ituation, the creditors still have an incentive to 
bargain ex post. There are two reasons for thi s. First, immediately after the 
announcement of financial distress, the gains and losses have not yet been 
distributed. The even t that separates ex ante from ex post is not a wealth-
transferring event , as it is in the accident case . Second, the parties have an 
incentive to bargain over the divis ion of the bankruptcy cost savings. Thus, 
even if finan c ial di stress inexorably implied a certain fixed pattern of 
distribution in bankruptcy, parties attempting to settle out of court would have 
something over which to barga in. Theoretically, bargaining in the financial 
distress situation can take place at a time when the identities of those affected 
are already fixed, that is, at a time when transaction costs would not prohibit 
negotiation. Although the parties have incentive to bargain, however, they are 
precluded at this point from bargaining by collecti ve action problems. If the 
collective action problems could be solved by suspending alternative methods 
of debt collection , the parties could bargain with one ar;other ex post. 
agreement ex ist. See supra note 26 and accompa nying te xt. 
37. See GUIDO C.ALAB RESI, THE COST o r: ACCIDENTS 90-92 ( 1970); Calabrcsi & Melamed. supra note 
34. at 1108-09. The theory is that, in the abse nce of transacti on costs. drivers would enter into ex ante 
agreements wi th one another in order to a ll ocate the risk of accidents in advance. Some drivers who va lued 
driv in g dangerously would purchase the right to do so from those they endangered. In order to ensure that 
the costs of every poss ible accident were allocated in advance, every driver would have to contract with 
every other dri ver (not to mention pedes trians) with whom he might come into contact. Moreover, ex ante 
contracts would have to specify every possible type of injury at the various possible level s of severity, in 
add iti on to the types of property damage, etc. Transaction costs clearly would be prohibitive, since both 
the number of dangerous dri vers and the variety of ri sks to which they ex pose others is cnor·rn ous. 
Alternatively, the parties could sign a single. vast contract, but in thi s case the agreement would have to 
spec ify every possible type of interaction, establi sh a price for each one, and make provisions prescribing 
the mode of wealth -transfer with respect to all such interacti ons. 
38. Calabresi & Me larned, supra note 34, at II 08-09. 
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IV. T EMPORARY SUSPENSION CLA USES 
The collective action proble m di sappears if creditors' state-law collection 
rights are unavailable when the debtor announces that he is in finan cial 
distress. The parties should therefo re incorporate a temporary waiver of 
creditors' collection rights under state law into the original debt instrument. 
The contract should spec ify a fixed suspen s ion period of relatively short 
duration , pe rhaps one month . The theory behind the suspension clause solution 
is that it enables the parties to negoti ate as well as provides maximal incentive 
for cooperation by re taining the threat advantage the creditors and the debtor 
ha ve over one another. It accomplishes this by re turnin g these rights at the e nd 
of the suspension period: the creditors are restored the ir right to collect under 
state law and the debtor is res to red hi s right to fil e for bankruptcy. 
Coordination is faciliated because all parties know that the other parties can 
resort to their legal rights if the negotiations do not succeed. Creditors know 
that they will have to compete with other creditors for the debtor's assets on 
a first-come-first-served basis if they cannot reach agreement. The creditors as 
a group know that the debtor may f1l e for bankruptcy if he is not permitted to 
retain a certain amount of the value of the firm for equity. And although the 
creditors' right to pursue collection under state law does not amount to much 
if debtor retains hi s power to enter Chapter 11, debtor may wish to avoid 
bankruptcy himself, and since the only answer he has to a rush on his assets 
is to file for Chapter 11 , he has reason to fear the creditors' invocation of their 
state-law rights. The suspension clause solution is thu s a way of exploiting the 
incentives created by exi sting legal reg imes to help maximi ze the parties' 
chances of avoiding using these reg imes 
Insolvency, as defined in the debt contract, triggers the suspension 
provision. At the relevant leve l of insolve ncy, the terms of a contract 
containing a suspension clause vvould require the debtor to notify its creditors 
of its financial position and to prov ide a reasonable account of its assets and 
liabilities. The debtor should propose a workout plan shortly after notification . 
The debtor could facilitate coordination by calling a general meeting of the 
creditors to explain the offer. Because creditors might require more time to 
evaluate the debtor 's offer, the parties might wish to include a provi s ion in the 
suspe nsion clause allowing the creditors to vote to extend the negotiation 
period, e ither unanimously or upon a certain number of votes. 
Although the suspension clause restrains both the debtor and the creditors 
from legal action during the suspension period , the parties do not in fact 
commit themselves to negotiate by including the clause in the debt instrument. 
They merely create a window of time during whic h they can safely explore 
extra-legal avenues. Conceivably, neither party will initiate negotiations. The 
parties' incentives to settle depends on the ir assessment of the like lihood of 
bankruptcy and of their probable returns in Chapter t l. For exa mple, if a 
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creditor does no t think the debtor likely to enter Chapter 11 at the end of the 
suspensio n period , she mig ht prefer to wait o ut the month and try to coll ect 
under s tate law. If, however, she fully ex pects the debtor to enter bankruptcy 
at the end of the waiting period , she has incentive to settle. Thu s a de btor can 
increase the likelihood of successful negoti atio ns if he can credibly threate n to 
ente r bankruptcy at the e nd of the suspe nsion period. 
A debtor, too , will weigh the like lihood of Chapter 11 in considering 
whe ther to atte mpt settlement. A debtor mi ght be particularl y inte rested in 
settling if he thinks he stands a reaso nable chance o f recovery. In that case, he 
might worry he would have to pay off the creditors' claims in full if he fails 
to settle. The debtor's optimal bargaining position is one in which he knows 
he has a reasonable chance of success but is able to convince creditors to the 
contrary. In order to avoid coercion of this sort, the parties should include 
significant disclosure requirements in the ir debt contracts to operate in 
conjunction with the suspe ns ion clause. 
One objection to thi s sc heme might be that the parties will not want to 
include the suspension clause in their debt contracts, even if they would want 
to settle once the suspension of state- law ri ghts had removed the impedime nts 
to consensual solutions . But the suspensio n clause should be attractive to 
anyone who had strong reasons to avoid litigation . The debtor and the various 
classes of creditors all share such reasons . 
Secured creditors will appreciate the advantages of a high-press ured 
negotiation, since they suffer most from the length of bankruptcy proceedings 
under the present system. Despite the requirement under the Bankruptcy C ode 
that secured creditors rece ive "adequate protection,"39 the Supreme Court has 
held that sec ured creditors are not entitled to compensation for the time value 
of the ir claims while bankruptcy proceedings are under way . .J0 Banks and 
other lenders who lend on a secured bas is are in effect required to make 
inte rest-free loans to debtors who enter Chapter 11. Normally, the return to 
secured creditors is not in doubt, since secured creditors can usuall y rece ive 
full value. Consequently, secured creditors are above all concerned with the 
speed of the proceedings. Although they will not rece ive a larger nominal sum 
in the workout than they would receive in bankruptcy, their interes t in early 
payment will make them more than willing to facilitate negotiations. Moreover, 
because loss of inte rest over a several-year period can be signific ant, sec ured 
creditors might even be willing, at the negoti at ion stage, to give up so me value 
in order to facilitate a workout. The excess could be used to coax recalci trant 
general creditors into accepting the debtor 's offer. 
39. II U.S.C. ~ 362(d)(l) ( 1988) . Acceptable methods for providing "adequate pro tection" are uefined 
in II U.S.C. § 36 1 (1988), but neither that sect ion nor§ 362(d)( l ) exp lain what consti tutes "adequate 
protection" in the context of sec ured creditors. 
40. United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Fores t Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 ( 1988). 
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Although the time savings also provides unsecured creditors with an 
incentive to incorporate the suspe nsion clause into their debt contracts, the cost 
savings advantages unsecured creditors most. The unsecured creditors usuall y 
benefit directly from an increase in the poo l of assets . In addition, since no 
single unsecured creditor can force the debtor into an in voluntary 
reorgani zation , an unsecured creditor may worry that the debtor w ill not enter 
Chapter 11 and will be di sman tled under state "grab" laws instead. Unsec ured 
creditors will we lco me the opportunity to reduce the likelihood of both these 
unfavorable outcomes. 
Finall y, the debtor al so has adequate incentive to avoid having to choose 
between a possibl e disman tling under state law or a long, drawn-out 
reorgani zation . Despite the ri se in the number of reorgani zations in the last 
thirty years, 41 significant stigma still accompanies bankruptcy. This stigma 
often trans lates into loss of goodwill and other impediments to financi al 
rehabilitation. Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig have recently cast 
doubt on the traditional wisdom that managers will attempt to avoid 
bankruptcy at all costs, claiming that Chapter 11 "serves mainly to protect 
managers' jobs."42 They claim th at managers who have mismanaged a 
company and fear replacement will throw the company into ban kruptcy in 
order to remain in contro l.43 But this claim is not supported by the 
evidence.44 Stuart Gilson, in a study of 409 of the most troubled public 
companies in Chapter 11 between 1979 and 1984, showed that managers lost 
their jobs within two years after fl.ling in 71 % of the cases.45 When taken in 
conjunction with studies showing extremely low turnover rates for nonbankrupt 
companies , as well as lower rates for di stressed, but nonbankrupt co mpanies, 
the Gilson study demonstrates that bankruptcy proceedings impair managerial 
security. 46 
A second objection might be that an attempt to conduct a private 
reorgani zation would encounter a preference problem. While the trustee in 
41 . The total number of co r-porate ban kruptcy fi lin gs rose from 12,284 in 1960 to 62,534 in 1989. 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DI RECTOR, ADMINISTRATI VE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS I 63 ( 1960) and 
ANNUA L REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADivii NISTRATIVE 0 f'F ICE OF THE U.S . COURTS 362 ( I 989). 
42 . Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Time ro Scratle Chapter I I, N.Y. TIM ES , Mar. 8, 1992, 
at F 13 . 
43. See Bradley & Rosenzwe ig, mpra note I, at I 050-5 I. They also claim that managers will be more 
incl ined to make risky inves tment decis ions because they kn ow that Chapte r II is ava il abl e in the event 
of fa il ure. !d. 
44. See Elizabeth Warren, Th e Unrenuble Case for Repeal ofChaprer If, 102 YALE L.J. 437,448-55 
( 1992). 
45 . Stuart C. Gi I son. Managemenr 7/u·nover and Financial Disrress, 25 J. FIN . ECO N. 241, 24 7 (I 989). 
Gilson al so shows that managers of financially di stressed companies who avoided Chapter II and 
restructured privately instead lost their jobs at a rate of 60% within two years of restructuring. !d. 
46. See Sheila M. Puffer & Joseph B. Weintrop, Corporare Performance and CEO Turnover: Th e Role 
of Performance Expecrarions, 36 AD"v1 1N. SCI. Q. I , 6-7 ( 1991) (reporting mean annuali zed turnover rate 
of 5.3% for CEO 's of 480 large publicly traded companies); Michael Weisbach, Owside Direcrors and 
CEO 1/m wver, 20 J. FiN. ECON . 43 1. 438 -4 I ( 1988) (report in g mean an nualized turnover rate of 3-5% fo r 
367 nondi stressed firms between 1974 and I 983). 
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C hapter 11 has the power to avoid transfers that have conveyed assets out of 
the de btor' s estate ninety days prior to the date of filing ,47 no one in the 
\VOrko ut situation is similarly empowered. A fi rm th at anticipates insolvency 
can convey all its assets to a preferred creditor, onl y then dec laring itself 
in solvent and open to negotiations. The creditors are apparently powerless to 
fo rce the return of the assets . 
T he re is, however, an implicit bargaining so lution to the preference 
prob lem under the suspen sion c lause reg ime. Because the suspension clause 
merely defers the threat of bankruptcy, a ll parties know that the dispute would 
stand a s ignificant chance of wind ing up in co urt if the parties fail to settle by 
the time the suspensio n period run s out. They also know that once thi s 
happe ns, assuming the nin ety-day preference period has not expi red, the 
prefe rred creditor's interest will be avoided. Other creditors now enjoy 
signific ant leve rage aga in st the preferred creditor, that is , as suming it is in their 
interests to expend the resources to bargain with him. If the prefen·ed creditor 
has received a substa ntial enough portion of the asse ts, it will not be worth the 
creditors ' while to settle with the debtor w ithout the return of these assets to 
the debtor 's es tate . In that case, the creditors w ill prefer bankruptcy to the 
workout offer, and thi s allows them to threaten credibl y to block any 
settl eme nt offer from the debtor. This leaves the debtor with no alternative but 
to ti le for bankruptcy at the end of the suspens ion period. If the debtor is 
recalcitrant , the creditors can also bring an ac tion under § 303 of the 
Bankruptcy Code to force the debtor into an in volun tary Chapter ll or C hapter 
7 proceeding . ~B 
The preferred creditor wi I! thus w ish to accept a settlement offer which 
accords her some amount between what she would rece ive in bankruptcy and 
the face value of her claim (ass uming she received the latter in the preferred 
transfer) . To induce her to give up value , other parties can offer some 
addition a l amount, representing the probability that the debtor might not 
:.1c tually e nter bankruptcy in the event that the suspension period expires 
w ithout se ttlement. She might , then , be able to hold out for sligh tl y more than 
she would have rece ived had she not already been paid. But if the debtor' s or 
the cred itors' threat to file for Chapter 11 is credibl e, thi s additional amount 
will be small. 
The above solution to the preferen ce problem depends on a relative ly short 
suspension period. What would happen if the parties wished to pro vide for a 
longer suspension period, for example, a three-instead of a one-month 
period? U nder current law, creditors would run the ri sk that the debtor would 
convey asse ts out of the estate just prior to the suspension period and then be 
47. II U.S.C. § 547 (b) ( 1988). 
48 . In o rder to bring an involuntary Chapter II o r Chapter 7 pet iti on, there must be three o r more 
creditors whose cla ims are noncontingent. and, if the re are fewer than 12 creditors, one m more of the 
creditors must have claims worth at leas t $5,000 in the aggregate. I I U.S.C. § 303(b) ( 1988). 
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unable to draw these assets back in in an eve ntual Chapter 11 proceeding. In 
order to allow the parties maximum flexibility in the time for suspen sion, § 
547 of the Bankruptcy Code could be amended to provide that the ninety-day 
preference period wou ld be tolled wh ile the suspension clause was in effect. 
The parties would then be free to adopt whatever suspens ion period they 
regarded as advantageous, withou t running the ri sk of losi ng th e threat 
advantage provided by the trustee 's avoid ing powers in an eve ntual 
bankru ptcy. The parties must add a clause forbidding the debtor from 
conveying assets out of the es tate during the suspens ion period. however, if the 
Bankruptc y Code were amended in thi s way. 
A third, an d perhaps more serious, objection is that pr ivate negotiations 
involve seriou s valuation problems. There are two aspect s to this objection. 
Fi rst , one might suppose that a neu tral third party is needed to resolve disputes 
about the val ue of the debtor firm 's asse ts. The parties ' cont1ic ting interests 
can lead them to reach extremely divergent conclusions about the size of the 
pool of assets. In general, secured credi tors have incentive to make low 
valuations of the firm, since equity's share is determined on a perce ntage basis. 
For the same reason , the debtor has incenti ve to inflate the value of the firm . 
Bu t, except in the event of a cramdown, the court in a Chapter II proceeding 
does not normally undertake an independen t evaluation of the debtor's 
assets.49 Judges rare ly resolve disputes over va luati on. If parties can rout inely 
resolve disputes through bargaining in bankruptcy without the help of an 
ou tside appraiser, they must be able to resolve these same disputes through 
bargaining outside of bankruptcy as well. 
The second aspect is that the extremely short time frame in whi ch 
negotiations take place under a suspension clause might exacerbate valuati on 
problems. Creditors will wish to inquire into the debtor's financial position and 
to assess the veracity of his represe ntati ons . The time pressure res tricts 
creditors' abi lity to do this and obligates the m to take the deb tor 's 
representations almost entirely at face value. But thi s feature of the suspension 
clause sol ution is not particularly object ionab le. Commentators have noted th at 
creditors usu ally consider themselves unable to conduct their own evaluations 
of the debtor's net worth in bankruptcy.50 In the usual case, the debtor 
presents a valuation of the firm in the context of a proposed reorganization 
plan. Creditors have difficulty objecting to the debtor 's valuation, because their 
access to in formati on about a debtor's financial status is limited . In addition, 
disclosure requirements wi ll mitigate the asymmetry of information. Although 
some asy mmetries will remain, asymmetries exist in bankruptcy as well. T here 
is no reason to suppose that the parties are worse off under a suspens ion clause 
49. See LoPucki & Whi tford, supra note 28, at 141 (aurihuting low inc ide nce of contested plan s Lo 
fear of overly complex cram-down hearings) . 
50. !d. at 129-30. 
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than they would be in bankruptcy on thi s question. Indeed , th ey might fare 
slightly bette r under the suspension clause solution, since the time and cost 
sav in gs help to compensate for any losses due to inaccuracies of valuation. 
A fin al possibl e objection to the suspension clause solution warrants 
particular attenti on. Suppose a workout situation in which it seems clear that 
the creditors would fall into roughly five classes if the parties ended up in 
Chapter ll litigation, class one ranking the highest. And suppose there is a 
pre ferred creditor who is a member of class four, and that she has received 
pa yme nt in full. The remaining asset pool is suffici entl y large to pay classes 
one through three, even after the pre ferred creditor has been paid in full. 
Suppose , the refore, that creditors from the f1rst three classes are willing to 
accept the workout offer. The remaining members of class four object to the 
offer, because under it they will receive $.50 on the dollar, whereas otherwise 
they rece ive $.75. The members of class five object to the offer, because under 
it they receive nothing and are deprived of their rightful share of the 
bankruptcy cost savings. 
Although, strictly speaking, there are no "classes" in a workout situation, 
since the eli vision of creditors into classes is proposed in the reorganization 
plan,51 the exampl e serves to illustrate a potential problem. Because the 
bargaining takes place " in the shadow" of bankruptcy law,52 the various 
interes ts of the creditors will depend on the priority each can expect to have 
in bankruptcy. To the extent that an eventual bankruptcy would impose a 
hierarchy of priorities, parties to a workout agreement have different level s of 
priority in the workout context and hence sharply divergent interests. Creditors 
may thus be unable to mobilize effectively against a preferred creditor, because 
thi s will often require unanimity of purpose. 
For thi s reason , the parties must append an additional provision to the 
suspe nsion c lause in the original debt contract: they must condition a workout 
offer on unanimous acceptance by creditors. Any creditor who is disadvantaged 
by a preferred transfer prior to the declaration of insolvency, but within the 
preference period, should have the power to block a workout agreement. The 
di sse ntin g creditor(s) could thus effectively strong-arm the preferred creditor 
into joining the negotiations, since if the former were suffi c iently aggrieved, 
the threat of bankruptcy would be credible. 
The combined operation of a suspension clause and a unanimous consent 
provision would result in an extremely high-pressured negotiation . While the 
obstacles to agreement may seem significant under such conditions, in theory 
the parti es stand to reap considerable savings of both money and time by 
accepting the offer. All have strong incentives to avoid bankruptcy, and they 
51. II U.S. C. 11 23 ( 1988); D OUGLAS G . BAI RD, THE ELEMENTS OF B AN KRU PTCY 235 ( 1992). 
52. See, e.g .. Robert Cooter et a!., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of 
Smilegic Beha vior, I I J. LEGAL STUD. 225 ( 1982); Robert H. Mnookin & L ewis Kornhauser, Bargaining 
in the Shadow of the Law: Th e Case of Divorce , 88 YALE L.J. 950 ( 1979). 
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will the refore work hard to reach agreeme nt. The parti es have reduced 
incentives for posturing and game playing in a short time frame, since these 
impair the prospects of settlement by ex pending valuable time and resources. 
In addition, each individual experiences pressure to cooperate, since a 
successful workout req uires the consent of all parties. As noted above, the 
advantages of reaching agreement quickly and informally may be high enough 
to induce the parti es to overlook the central disadvantage of speedy 
negotiations-the inability to conduct an extensive investigation of the debtor' s 
assets. They may thus be w illing to ri sk a certain amount of inaccuracy 111 
valuation in order to wind up their affa irs as quickly as poss ible.53 
V. UNANIMOUS CONS ENT CLAUSES AND THE HOLDOUT PROB LEM 
An indi vidual creditor has incentive to withhold her co nse nt from a 
workout offer, since if enough other creditors accept, the workout wi ll succeed, 
and the dissenti ng cred itors will be paid in full. This is known as the "holdout 
problern. "5'1 As Douglas Baird explains , "[e]ven though it is in the rati onal 
interest of the group to re negotiate the loan ... , it is in the self- interest of 
each individual creditor to hold out and hope that others compromise their 
claims."55 
Scholars often blame the holdout problem for the low settlement rates in 
this area of the law. 56 Whi le the holdout problem is a serious one, it does not 
provide an adeq uate explanation for the observed settlement rates. The holdout 
problem can on ly impede workouts once the parties are able to negotiate with 
one another. But, as argued abovc,57 co llec tive action problems render ex post 
intercreditor negotiations extremely difficult. The holdout problem, in other 
words, can only provide an explanation for the fai lure of workouts that are in 
fac t attempted. But as discussed above in the context of uncertainty, there is 
reason to think that most cases of serious corporate finan cial distress pass 
di rectly into Chapter 11 , without even attempting a private workout before 
resorting to litigation.58 The holdout problem arguably provides an 
explanation for failed workouts where the parties undertook negotiation s but 
could not reach agreement. Nevertheless, the smal l number of attempted 
negotiations supports the contention that the collecti ve ac ti on problem is 
principall y responsible for the low settlement rates. Thus , although a solu tion 
53. See mpra text accompanying notes 48-49. In addition, as already noted. the risk of inaccurate 
va luation may be no greater in a workout than in bankruptcy. 
54. See BA IRD, supra note 50, a t 73; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 2. Mark Roe is responsib le for first 
characterizing the problem in these terms. Roe, Sllpra note 6, at 236. 
55. BAIRD, supra note 50, at 73. 
56. See. e.g., Roe. supra note 6, at 235-37. 
57. See supra Part II. 
58. See supra text accompanying note 30 and sources cited therein. 
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to the holdout problem is called for, it is called for only insofar as the pnor 
impediments to negotiation have been el iminated. 
The holdout problem di sappears in bankruptcy, because it is possible for 
acquiesc ing creditors to bind di ssenters 5~ It is generally not possible to bind 
di ssenters o utside of bankruptcy.60 If bankruptcy is to be effectively avo ided, 
the suspen sion clause solution must be supplemented with a solution to the 
holdout problem. Several such solutions h:we been proposed in the literature 
to date. 
A. Majori ty Rule Clauses 
A number of scho lars have argued th at the holdout problem can be solved 
by th e inclusion of a majority rule c lause in the debt contract.6 1 Majority rule 
clauses allow a spec ifie d percentage of debt holders to amend the cond itions 
of the debt agreements of the other creditors.62 Under such a regime, a 
majority of creditors who accept an offer could bind the remaining creditors 
to the workout share. Majority rule c lauses, however, at least those that impair 
the debtholders' right to payment, are barred in the case of public debt by 
§ 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (hereinafter the "TIA") . 63 
Some scholars accordingl y call for the repeal of the TIA's prohibition of 
majority rule clauses.64 They point out that if two-thirds of the creditors are 
allowed to cram down a plan of reorganizat ion on di ssenting creditors in 
bankruptcy, it is odd to di sallow the same outs ide bankruptcy. 65 But it is not 
difficult to understand the rationale for the asymmetry between bankruptcy and 
nonbankruptcy on thi s poin t. The situations in which creditors are allowed to 
alter the contractual terms of their fellow bondholders over the dissent of the 
59. II U.SC. § 1126 ( 1988) (bi ndi ng dissenting min ority of class); I I U.S.C. ~ 11 29 ( 1988) (binding 
dissentin g cl asses) . 
60. As Doug las Ba ird writes, "Outside of bankruptcy, the trade cred itors have no way to overcome 
the holdout problem. Firm may end up in Chapter I I because the trade cred itors need a lega l mechanism 
that allows the majority to bind the minority." Bi\I RD, Sl ipra note 50, at 73; see also Kashner, supra note 
6, at 123. 
61. See Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, Bankrup1n· and Afiency CrJS/s: Th eir Significan ce 
10 the Theory of Optimal Capital Stmcture. 23 J. FIN. & QUA~TITATI VE ANALYS IS 27, 30 ( 1988); Kashner, 
st1pra note 6. at 123 -24; Roe, supra note 6, at 249. 
62 . Kashner, S11pra note 6, at 124. 
63. 53 Stat. 11 73 ( 1939) (cod ified at 15 U.S.C ~ 77ppp(b) ( 1988)) . 
64 . See, e.g .. Roc, supra note 6, at 235 . Sch wartz poin ts ou t, howeve r, th::tt lifting restrictions against 
such clauses may not help, since cred itors may prefe r not to usc them. He argues that such clauses create 
incentives for debtors to make workout offers that are less favorable to creditors than the "success ful" offer, 
i.e. the offer that retains for debtor on ly enough to give him the return he wou ld get in bankruptcy, plus 
the share of the cost sav ings avoidin g bankruptcy entail s. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 7; see also infra Part 
V(B). He al so points out that majority rul e clauses are no t commonly used where they are not forbidden, 
namely in nonpublic debt issues. Schwart z, supm note 6, at 5. 
65. See generally Roe, supra note 6, at 255. Roe explain s that thi s asymmetry was not always presen t. 
Prior to 1978, it was the case that bondholders could onl y be boun d in bankruptcy against their consent 
pursuant to a show ing that junior interes ts were impaired on ly to the ex tent necessa ry to assu re bondholder 
compensation. !d. 
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latter should be carefully c ircumscribed. If a maj ority of creditors could bind 
the minority at will, the majority would have every reason to offer the minority 
bondholders nothing on their claims and to split the rema ining pool o f assets 
amo ng me mbers of the maj o rity. 66 Thi s is a danger no matter how large a 
majority the clause requires for the offer to succeed , s ince the cred itors in the 
majority would always prefer to have the minority 's share to div ide among 
themse lves . M oreover, absent restraint s, creditors offered a return on the ir 
cla ims would have every reason to rejec t any offer tha t fa iled to se ll out the 
a ll owed minority percentage of creditors, s ince the co nse nt of the latter would 
no t be required fo r the workout to succeed. Anything the minority received 
would be superrluous from the majority's perspective. 
Advocates of majority rul e solutions to the holdout problem may suppose 
that the majo rity could on ly bind the minority to the same share that the 
majority creditors receive themselves.67 But in light o f the fact that creditors 
ca n expect to receive different treatment in bankruptcy depending on their level 
of priority, this solution will not work. The minority creditors might e njoy a 
higher prio rity than the majority c reditors . Debt con trac ts would have to 
spec ify priority levels and to bar the majority from binding dissenters to 
workout shares that did no t reflect their bankruptcy priority share. A part from 
the o ther complications this would add to the negotiation of debt contracts, it 
would exacerbate valuation problems. For exampl e, high prio rity creditors 
would attempt to place a low valuation on the c laims of lower priority, 
minority cred itors . There would be no neutral judge to oversee the valuation 
efforts of the parties. Nor could the debtor be expected to offer a dis interested 
va luation of the minority's claims, since senior creditors could collude with the 
debtor to agree on valuations that wo uld allow them to appropriate a portion 
of the minority 's share. 
The TIA could be modified to permit good faith maj ority rule 
c lauses-majority rule clauses that do not c ircum vent the rights of dissenting 
minority creditors. The TIA, in other words, could contain prov is ions si milar 
to sec tions of Chapter 11 that es tablish a baseline for the protection of minority 
interes ts: the plan must e ither be in the best in teres ts of the creditors, 6~ 
meaning that a dissenting class of credito rs must rece ive at least as much as 
it would receive under a Chapter 7 liquidation ,69 or, failin g that , the plan 
66. Thi s is prec ise ly what happened under the old eq uity recei vershi ps. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 
228 U.S. 482 ( 19 13) (ho lding that a freezcout of trade cred itors is not pe rmi ss ible). T he drafters of the 1978 
Code adopted what is known as the "best inte res t of the c red itors'' tes t, II U.S. C. § 11 29(a)(7) ( 1988), and 
the "fair and equi tab le" requirement , II U.S. C.§ 11 29(b) ( 1988) , specifically in order to e li m inate freezing 
out of middle-leve l c reditors. 
67 . Alan Schwartz has suggested that there is an un sta ted assumpt ion to this effect in the writing on 
majority rule c lauses. Interview with A lan Schwart z. Wi ll iam K. Townsend Professor of Law. Yal e Law 
Schoo l, in New Haven, Conn. (Nov. 19, 1992). 
68. II U S.C. § 1129(a)(7) ( 1988). 
69. !d. 
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must be "fair and equitable ," meaning that it must respect absolute priority. 70 
But these standards are admittedly nebulous, since whether a plan is fair and 
equitable must be determined in light of the specifics of each case. Judicial 
supe rvision is thus needed to determine whether minority inte res ts have been 
properly res pected. If left to interpret the import of s imilar phrases themselves, 
creditors would surely attempt to collude with the debtor to push through 
abusive offers. To avoid thi s kind of abu se, a majority of creditors should be 
allowed to bind a minority only where the interests of the dis senting 
bondholders can rece ive some protection from an independent third party. 
Chapter 11 , however, is not the only safeguard again st majority tyranny. 
There must, at least in theory, be other, less costly ways to prevent creditors 
from freezing one another out. If we accept the premise of the creditors' 
bargain model that reo rganization is in the interests of the creditors as a group, 
a successful workout should not require giving some creditors the power to 
bind di ssenting creditors. Theoretically, there should be a workout offer that 
would be in the interest of all to accept. Rather than permit a majority of 
creditors to bind a minority, and then require an expensive judicial proceeding 
to ensure that minority interests are respected, it would make more sense to 
retain the ban on majority rule clauses and to attempt to facilitate private 
agreements that all parties would prefer to bankruptcy. It is this last in s ight 
that motivates a second proposed solution to the holdout problem. 
B. Successful Offer Clauses 
In a recent paper, Alan Schwartz offers the following diagnosis of the 
holdout problem.71 There is an offer, Schwartz argues, that all would accept: 
an offer that gives each creditor the amount she would receive in bankruptcy, 
plus a pro rata share of the cost savings. Call this offer the "successful 
offer."71 In general, as discussed above, 73 equityholders can count on 
receiving a certain amount of the value of the firm in a reorgani zation. The 
successful offer thus gives a creditor her appropri ate share of the pre-
bankruptcy value of the firm (i.e. the value of the firm before bankruptcy costs 
are taken into account), minus the payment to equity and the workout costs. 
The return to a single creditor under the successful offer is presented as 
w = n% (v - s - e ) 
I S ' 
where W; is the workout share of the creditor in question , v the pre-bankruptcy 
value of the firm, s the cost of the workout arrangement, es the share allotted 
70. ! I U.S.C. § 1129(b)( I) , (2) (1988) . 
7 1. Schwartz, s11pra note 6. 
72. !d. at 5. 
73. See supra tex t accompanying note 28 and sources cited there in. 
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to equity, and n% the creditor's appropriate share of the assets 7 4 Assuming 
that the value of the debtor's assets less the workout costs is greate r than the 
value of those assets less the bankruptcy costs (in other words (v - s) > (v -
c), where c is the costs of bankruptcy proceedings), the cred itor rece ives more 
under the successful offer than she does in bankruptcy (w; > b;, where b; 
represents the bankruptcy share) . The creditor thus has no incenti ve to refuse 
the offer, if she thinks bankruptcy is the only alternative. 
Schwartz argues for this reason that " the holdout proble m J oes not arise 
' naturall y' from the payoff structure."75 Debtor firms, in e ffect, choose to 
create the holdout problem, by makin g offers which are not th e successful 
offer. Instead of success ful offers, firms routinely make "greedy 
offe rs"-offers that re ta in a larger share for equity than the portion it wou ld 
receive in bankruptcy. Credit•-rs have incentive to reject greedy offers because 
they know there is another offer the firm can make-the success ful 
offer- which would be more to their advantage and yet still be worth the 
debtor' s while to make. Creditors have strong incentives to rej ect a greedy 
offer, then, because they know the debtor has retained more for himself than 
is strictly necessary. 
Why would a creditor think that bankruptcy is the only alternative to the 
successful offer if she does not think this in the case of the greedy offer? One 
might suppose that in the face of a successful offer she still has incentive to 
hold out, in the hope that others will compromise their claims and she can 
reject and be paid in full. The answer follows from the structure of the 
successful offer. An implication of Schwartz's analysis is that the success ful 
offer leaves the debtor with no excess funds , and thus with nothing to pay 
rejecters . Since the successful offer awards equity the minimum 5%, the debtor 
has no excess funds to pay rejecters. The debtor spends everything save 5%. 
Greedy offers, by contrast, leave out funds which the debtor can use to pay 
rejecters because equity can give up some value and still be better off than it 
would be in bankruptcy. 76 Successful offers therefore contain an implicit 
unanimity condition, since anything less than unanimous acceptance dooms the 
offer to failure. 
H av ing analy zed the problem in this way, Schwartz presents the following 
solution: debt contracts should incorporate a successful offer clause, that is , a 
clause requiring the debtor to make the successful offer. Firms wili thus be 
unable to make greedy offers, and the offer they make will be accepted. 
74. Schwartz, supro note 6, at 12. Schwartz calculates the appropriate share o n a percentage basis , 
which is accurate in the case in which there is onl y one class of debt. The percentage represents the single 
creditor' s share of the class. Thus if a certain creditor holds I 0% of the debt of the class. and there is only 
one class, his workout offer will be w; = .10 (v - s- e,). 
75. Schwartz, supm note 6, at 5. 
76. It would not be worth debtor's while to make an offe r that required it to dip into its own share 
to pay disse nters, since debtor would prefer bankruptcy to that state of affairs. The firm's threat to e nter 
bankruptcy if the successfu l offer is rejected is thus c redible . 
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The problem with Schwartz 's solution, as he himself points out,77 is that 
successful offer clauses are unenforceable , since they involve a waiver of the 
debtor 's ri ght to use the legal bankruptcy process . Bankruptcy waivers are 
banned. 78 Schwartz therefore argues that the ban on bankruptcy waivers 
should be lifted. 79 He argues that the ban on wa ive rs serves no purpose where 
the debtor is a corporation, si nce the paternali stic concerns about consumer 
coercion are inappropriate in the corporate context. Among other thin gs, 
individuals have the right to have their debts discharged in bankruptcy, but 
corporations have no such right. 8° Furthermore , asy mmetries in the parties' 
access to information just ify protecting the individual more than the corporate 
debtor. 
There are, however, a number of objections to lifting the ban o n waivers. 
First, it will be recalled that the solution to the preference problem in the 
workout co ntext depends on the ability of the debtor and/or the remaining 
creditors to threaten the preferred creditor wi th bankruptcy if the latter does not 
agree to j oin the negoti ations.81 Under the suspension solution they can do 
this , because the parties retain the right to ava il themselves of the bankruptcy 
process after the suspension period has expired. Under Schwartz's solution, by 
contrast, the parti es have committed themselves to an extra-judicial solution in 
advance. Because they have mutuall y agreed to forego their right to use 
Chapter 11 , they lose the threat ad vantage they might have had over preferred 
creditors. It is true that preferring a creditor would constitute a breach of the 
successful offer term in the debt instrument. The creditors would thus have the 
right to sue the debtor collectively for breach of contract, and they could 
presumabl y sue the preferred creditor for torti ous interfe rence with contract. 
But from a strategic perspective, it may be imposs ible to mobilize a c reditor 
suit, since many creditors will be unaffected by the preference and would not 
care whether their share is paid from the preferred creditor 's fund or from the 
lower priority creditors' share. The debtor must have leverage over the 
preferred creditor for the return of the assets to be assured, and the o nly 
possible source of leverage the debtor has is his power to enter bankruptcy. 
Second, there may be good reasons for retaining the ban on waivers for 
corporate debtors. Large lenders are often more powerful and enjoy a superior 
bargaining position in negoti ation than even average-s ized public . companies. 
O ne would expect to see systematic use of bankruptcy waivers, if permitted. 
There may be some complex cases, however, where the coordination 
advantages of court supervision are indispensable. Under Schwartz's solution, 
debtors legitimately in need of Chapter 11 may not avail themselves of it. 
77. Schwartz, supra note 6 , at 59. 
78. See United States v. Royal Business Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12. 15 (2d C ir. 1983) . 
79. Schwanz, .wpra note 6, at 7. 
80. /d. at 7-8. 
8 1. See supra text accompanying notes 45 -48. 
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Debtors would thus lose a s ignificant body of rights-the bargaining power 
conferred b y the ability to enter Chapter 11 and the ability to use Chapter 11 
when it is ind ispensable-and would have gained little for it. Although the ban 
on waivers may be unnecessary in the corporate context, a solution to the 
holdout problem which relies on this st ill te ndentious c laim is subject to doubt. 
Thi rd , parties might resist using a c lause th at contains a waiver of 
b~1.nkruptcy. S ince the debtor's only bargaining power comes from his ability 
to threaten bankruptcy, waiving the right to fil e in C hapter 11 would impair 
the power to force negotiations and inhibit his ability to demand the customary 
5% return to equity. Creditors could conceivably ex tort greater returns than the 
successful offer provides, and the debtor wo uld be unable to object. Of course 
debtor could resis t the creditors' demands if he could prove they violated the 
successful offer clause, but this would in volve the debtor in difficult and costly 
liti gation on the highly speculati ve ques tion of what the successful offer clause 
reqmres. 
C. Unanimous Consent Clauses 
The pure unanimous consent clause discussed in the context of the 
preference problem solves the holdout problem without the difficulties the 
majority rule and the successful offer clauses e ncounter. Unlike the majority 
rule clause, a unanimous consent clause does not run afoul of the Trust 
Indenture Act , because it does not allow some creditors to bind others. U nlike 
the successful offer clause, it does not entail a waiver of bankruptcy. It is both 
legal and it preserves the debtor 's onl y source of bargaining stre ngth. Because 
offers that are in the interests of all parties are s table from a bargaining 
perspective, a mandatory settlement clause should be unnecessary. The parties 
have adequate incentive to settle once we e liminate the co llective action and 
the ho ldout problems.~2 
A unanimity condition may seem a counterintuitive mean s of facilitating 
agreement among large numbers of indi vid uals with di vergent inte rests . People 
arc irrational, and one might think that someone would always insi st on 
holding out, even though it is in everyone 's interes t to accept. If this were true, 
unanimous consent would reduce, rather than enhance , the prospects for 
agreement. But consider the reasoning of an individual creditor. She would 
find nothing to lose by accepting the workout offer. If she accepts the 
82. In stead of in corporating unan imou s consent clauses into the debt contracts. debtors co uld make 
their offers conditional on unanimou> conse nt. Creditors would in effect be presented with a take-it-or-
leave-it offer. But incorporatin g the unanimity requirement into the debt contract would be preferable. since 
li rms might be put under pressure by creditors who wished to attempt to hold out to make the otTer 
conditi oned on the acceptance of less than I 00% of the creditors. Such pressure could unravel the workout, 
and. given the time limitati ons under the suspen >ion period so lution , precious time would be lost in 
reac hing agreement. 
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agreement and it succeeds, she will receive what she would have rece ived in 
bankruptcy, plus a share of the cost sav ings. If it fails, she w ill end up in 
bankruptcy. If, on the other hand , she rejects, she will end up in bankruptcy 
anyway. She might consider rejecting in order to induce other creditors to 
bribe her to accept. But , like the successful offer, there will be no excess funds 
to use to pay di ssente rs. If other creditors give up va lue, they will prefer 
bankruptcy, and the workout will fail. Since the creditor knows this, and the 
limited time frame creates incentives to move immed iate ly to the cooperative 
position, she will accept the offer. The only poss ible reason she might refuse, 
then, is if she thought she would receive more in bankruptcy. But by 
h ypothes is she will not. 
A problem with greedy offers, however, may re main. Under a pure 
un an imity condition, what would prevent a debtor from making a greedy offer 
to creditors, thereby resurrecting the holdout problem in a different form? 
Presumably unde r the time pressure created by the suspension clause, the 
debtor has an incentive to make offers likely to succeed. The poss ible range 
of abuse is thu s restricted. But some greedy offers will nevertheless pass. In 
general, a greedy offer in which either (1) the debtor's threat to enter 
bankruptcy if the offer fails is not credible, or (2) creditors are offered less 
than they would receive through litigation (factoring in the costs of delay) will 
fail. The fact that other greedy offers will pass is not objectionable. 
First, consider offers in which the debtor is willing to se ttle for less than 
he retains for himself under the present workout offer, in other words, in 
which there exists a lower offer at which the debtor would still be willing to 
forego bankruptcy. In this case, the debtor's threat to enter bankruptcy will not 
be credible, and the offer will fail. When this happens , the debtor will 
presumably make another offer. If the threat to enter bankruptcy upon the 
failure of this new offer is not credible, the offer will fail again , and the debtor 
can make a third offer. The debtor will make offers repeatedly until the parties 
settle. The point of agreement will fall within a certain range: a debtor's 
workout share, ew (return to equity), must be greater than or eq ual to the 
debto r' s bankruptcy return, eb, and similarly the creditors' workout share, cw 
must be greater than or equal to her bankruptcy return, cb. If C represents the 
bankruptcy cost savings, then there is some value, x, between 0 and C, 
representing the share of the cost savings that the creditors collectively receive, 
where the parties will settle. Thus we can express the debtor's share as 
ew = eb + C -X, 
and the creditors' share as 
cw = cb + x. 
On one end of the spectrum, x = C, where the debtor will receive no m ore 
than he would have received in bankruptcy. On the other end, x = 0, meaning 
that the parties settle where the debtor receives the full amount of the cost 
savmgs. 
-
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If we suppose that mo tivations are transparent, c reditors can only hope to 
rece ive the full cost sav in gs if they prefer bankruptcy to any se ttle ment where 
cw < cb +C. S imilarly, the debtor can only hope to rece ive the full cost savings 
if he prefers ba nkruptcy to any settle me nt where ew < eb + C . Realistically, 
credi tors will prefer a workout to bankruptcy, e ven where cw = cb, since 
workouts in vo lve a considerable time sav ings . The same is probably true of the 
debtor, if not fo r the time savings , th en because of the stigma bankruptcy 
liti gation in vo lves . If these fo rces are eve nl y balanced, the debtor and creditors 
w ill split the cos t sav ings. If they are not eve nl y balanced , then the party who 
most wishes to avoid bankruptcy will be forced to give up some portion of the 
savings to the other, prov ided his moti vations can be accurately assessed. 
Because credito rs, especially secured creditors, are eager to avo id the delays 
bankruptc y li t igation in vo lves, one can expect corporate debtors to fare 
signifi cantly bette r in workouts than they would in bankruptcy. 
If, on the other hand, the parties can bluff, the n a greedy offe r which di d 
not reflect a Nash equilibrium might succeed, because the misled party would 
not have had an opportunity to assess the payoffs correctly. We saw this in the 
context of negotiations during the suspe nsion period: if a debtor can fal se ly 
convince cred itors of an intention to fil e for bankruptcy, he may win a 
settlement he could not win if he were honest about his intentions. But 
presumably no one will have been made worse off by the workout , since an y 
one who would have preferred bankruptcy to the workout share can s impl y 
refuse to enter into the se ttlement. It may not , at any rate, be as easy for the 
parties to bluff as one might think. The debtor's motivations are rational and 
ari se out of states of affairs that are as observable to creditors as to the debto r. 
C reditors can make reasonable guesses about what a debtor is like ly to regard 
as advantageous. 
Offers under which creditors are offered les s than they would receive in 
bankruptcy present an eve n more obvious example of the kind of greedy offe r 
that should fail. It would be impossible for such an offer to pass, exce pt in the 
unlikel y event that one party would be willing to accept less than her 
bankruptcy share in the hope that the time savings would make up for the loss 
in value. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To the extent that the bankruptcy literature has taken the collective acti on 
problem seriously, it presents it as a just ification for Chapter 11. Scholars who 
argue in this way, however, fail to notice that the collective ac tion problem 
cannot justify the existence of Chapter 11 as a whole . It provides at bes t a 
justification fo r the automatic stay, and it does that only if there is not a more 
cost-effective method for preventing a run on the debtor's assets. This No te 
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has presented one alternative to Chapter 11 which in all likelihood would 
in volve considerable cost savings. 
On the other hand, those who press for private alternatives to Chapter 11 
litigation tend to minimize the importance of the coll ec ti ve actio n problem. 
They blame the low settlement rates on the holdout problem instead, and they 
consequently focus their attention on solutions de signed to bring about 
agreement at the negotiation stage . This Note has argued, despite the 
importance of ensuring that the ho ldout problem does not defeat potentially 
successful workouts, that the collecti ve ac tion problem is responsible for the 
obse rved se ttl ement rates. It has argued accordingly that solving the holdout 
problem w ill not substantially increase settlement rates unless acco mpanied by 
a method for facil itating negot iations. It has suggested that the number of 
private workout agreements would increase significantly under a contractual 
regi me that suspended creditors' state- law collect ion rights for a limited pe riod 
o f time, if implemented in conjunction with a unanimous consent clause. 
The efficacy of the proposed solution may seem dubious in light of the 
fact that parti es to debt contracts do not now, nor have they ever, included 
suspension cl auses in their debt instruments. One might su ppose that 
experie nced lenders, fo r example, would have di scovered that suspending thei r 
own and other creditors' state law rights would facilitate negotiations , and 
would have attempted it in some form . It is often diffi cult , however, fo r 
individuals to conceive of the necessi ty of self-limiting provi sions , solutions 
whic h requ ire a willingness to res tric t one's own freedom in order to inc rease 
one's welfare. This may be espec ially true in the context of competitive and 
somewhat adversarial business negotiations, in which part ies are ex tremely 
wary of weakening their bargaining positions. Suspension clauses and 
unanimity provisions may not be used because it is highly counte rintuitive to 
restrict one's legal remedies as a method for faci litating bargaining . But parties 
to debt contracts must attempt to think systemically, and attempt to fashion a 
new legal regime based on voluntary, rather than mandatory, rul e-making if 
they hope to avoid expens ive and cumbersome centralized proceedings. The 
more parties to financial agreemen ts act as their own po li cy makers, the more 
e ffi c ient they can make their interact ions. 
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